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AlliancesIn small scale societies, lethal attacks on another individual usually invite revenge by the victim's family. We
might expect those who perpetrate such attacks to do so only when their own support network (mainly family)
is larger than that of the potential victim so as tominimise the risk of retaliation. Using data from Icelandic family
sagas, we show that this prediction holds whether we consider biological kin or afﬁnal kin (in-laws): on average,
killers had twice as many relatives as their victims. These ﬁndings reinforce the importance of kin as a source of
implicit protection evenwhen they are not physically present. The results also support Hughes' (1988) claim that
afﬁnes are biological kin because of the shared genetic interests they have in the offspring generation.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)1. Introduction
The suggestion that numbers matter in conﬂict situations has been
widely acknowledged ever since Lanchester (1916) articulated his prin-
ciple of a relationship between relative strength and attrition rates in
pre-gunpowder human warfare (Johnson & McKay, 2015). This claim
is supported by evidence that both chimpanzees (Wilson, Britton, &
Franks, 2002; Wrangham, 1999) and people (Buss & Duntley, 2003)
are only likely to attack other individuals when they have a signiﬁcant
numerical advantage. However, Lanchester's Law was formulated in
the context of conﬂicts between strangers, where numerical advantage
at the time of attackmaywell be crucial. In species that have bonded so-
cial systems in which kin formmutually protective alliances (Dunbar &
Shultz, 2010), the cost–beneﬁt ratio associated with within-group con-
ﬂictmay bemoderated by the risk that an aggressor incurs from retribu-
tion by the victim's relatives. In most small scale human societies,
murder can trigger highly disruptive vendettas between lineages, and
these vendettas often continue for generations (Chagnon & Bugos,
1979; Knauft, 1987; Lee, 1979).
Among humans, the propensity to hold back from killing close rela-
tives (Daly & Wilson, 2001; Dunbar, Clark, & Hurst, 1995; Johnson &
Johnson, 1991) has been attributed to the operation of kin selection
(Hamilton, 1964). Nepotism is known to play a prominent role inmedi-
ating a wide range of human interactions from co-residence, to helping
with farmwork and childcare, and straightforward altruism (Berté,
1988; Betzig & Turke, 1986; Chagnon & Bugos, 1979; Hames, 1987;).
. This is an open access article under
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olhumbehav.2016.09.001Hill & Hurtado, 1996; Jones, 2000; Madsen et al., 2007). Kinship might,
however, play a different, but equally important, indirect role bymoder-
ating aggression between adults through the protection that kin offer a
potential victim targeted by an aggressor: aggressors know that they
risk retribution at the hands of the victim's relatives. In species where
kin form functional alliances for self-defense, individuals may be less
willing to attack those who belong to large extended families. There is
some suggestion that such effects may occur in nonhuman primates.
AmongOldWorldmonkeys, juveniles are less likely to threaten individ-
uals who belong to higher ranking matrilines, even when the members
of those matrilines are not visible (Colvin, 1983; Datta, 1983; Johnson,
1987). Similarly, in both baboons and macaques, members of a
matriline may precipitously lose rank following the death of the matri-
arch because they lack the coalitionary support that previously
prevented other individuals challenging them (Bernstein & Ehardt,
1986; Hausfater, Altmann, & Altmann, 1982).
So far, however, no studies have explicitly explored the effect of kin-
ship on humans' willingness to attack others. Viking Age Iceland offers a
unique opportunity to test this hypothesis for several reasons (for fur-
ther background, see ESM). First, North European society during the
ﬁrst millennium AD was unusually violent since it was underpinned
by a default principle of “might is right”. Many of the conﬂicts that
arose between individuals and families involved disputes over land,
and in many cases were targeted attempts to acquire land or resources
by force; in other cases, they were about the defense of individual or
family honor (which in turn had implications for the likelihood that
others would try to wrest resources from the family). Iceland during
theViking settlement period lacked anykindof overarchingpolitical au-
thority to moderate the activities of powerful individuals, and malethe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
hen to murder among the Icelandic Vikings, Evolution and Human Be-
Table 1
Kinship categories used in the analyses.
Biological kin r Number of connections
in the sampled sagas
Full siblings 0.50 1004
Paternal relatives:
Father 0.50 613
Uncle, aunt, grandmother, grandfather, half sibling 0.25 1051
Father's cousins 0.125 607
Maternal relatives:
Mother 0.50 262
Uncle, aunt, grandmother, grandfather, half siblings 0.25 806
Mother's cousins 0.125 521
Total = 4864
Afﬁnal relatives
Wife/Husband 320
Spouse's siblings, father, mother 781
Total = 1101
Foster kin
Foster father 11
Foster mother 7
Foster siblings (foster parents' children) 32
Total = 50
2 M. Palmstierna et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior xxx (2016) xxx–xxxmortality fromwithin-community conﬂict was unusually high (Dunbar
et al., 1995). Second, kinship and extended family were extremely im-
portant, both for reasons of land inheritance and as a source of protec-
tion. With no central authority to bring killers to account, it was the
responsibility of the victim's family, and occasionally friends, to pursue
the case (Byock, 2001). By the same token, kinwere regarded as equally
culpable and thus legitimate targets for revenge killings, somuch so that
killings often triggered vendettas that continued across generations
(Byock, 1982, 2001; Wallette, 2010). Killing someone was thus ex-
tremely risky because it put the killer's entire kin group at risk. Third,
Iceland boasts a unique set of historical records (the medieval family
sagas) that detail events at the individual level as well as providing in-
formation from which extended community-wide pedigrees can be
constructed (see ESM).
We tested the hypothesis that individuals preferred to target victims
with smaller kin groups than themselves. We differentiate between
three potential kinds of kin, namely biological relatives, afﬁnes (in-
laws) and foster kin. In humans, afﬁnes (or in-laws) constitute an
important class of relatives in this context because they signiﬁcantly ex-
tend the pool of potential allies. One reasonwhy afﬁnesmight bewilling
to offer support in these cases is that they share an interest in the ﬁtness
of the progeny that arise from the marriage which unites the two fam-
ilies (Burton-Chellew & Dunbar, 2011; Hughes, 1988). In addition to
these two more conventional types of kinship, the Vikings, in common
with many other societies, also recognized foster kinship. This typically
involved a child fromone family living, or growing up, in someone else's
household, usually as a formal recognition of a special relationship be-
tween the two families (in many cases associated with political or eco-
nomic deals). Fostering arrangements were common among the
Vikings, with foster relationships carrying emotional and social weight
that bore many superﬁcial resemblances to kinship, not least in terms
of the language used to describe the relationship (Wallette, 2010).2. Methods
We collated data on major social interactions described in three
Icelandic family sagas: Egil's Saga (Pálsson & Edwards, 1959), Njal's
Saga (Magnussen & Pálsson, 1970) and the Laxdæla Saga (Magnussen
& Pálsson, 1975): see ESM). Laymen often mistakenly assume that a
saga is a poem. In fact, it means exactly what it does in English: a story
or history. The family sagas are family histories and provide accounts
of actual events that engulfed an entire community, with many being
written between within living memory of the events they describe.
Each saga describes the events that occurred during a particular period
and gives detailed information on births, marriages and deaths, as well
as more casual social events (visits, fosterings, plots, scheming, deals
and, most important of all, feuds). As a result of the feuds that took
place in the three sagas, 31 of the 87 males who appear in them as
main characters were killed, showing just how violent such feuds
could be (see also Dunbar et al., 1995).
We extracted data on 1891 separate social events (including con-
ﬂicts and murders) involving a total of 1020 individuals. Since the
sagas record births and marriages, as well as deaths, and Norse sur-
names are patronymics (and mothers' names are often speciﬁed as
well), we were able to build a single extended pedigree that included
all these 1020 individuals, with only a small number of isolates not re-
lated by family to other community members. Most, but not all, of
these isolateswere slaves. In total, therewere 6015 kinship connections
distributed over 1101 afﬁnal, 50 foster, 2271 paternal kin, 1689 mater-
nal kin and 1004 sibling connections (Table 1). Due to the status
assigned to concubines in Iceland, these were counted as wives and
the woman's family as her husband's afﬁnes, despite the couple not
being married. Their illegitimate offspring was therefore included in
the count as half siblings (r = 0.25) for the man's legitimate offspring
since they were often raised in the same family.Please cite this article as: Palmstierna, M., et al., Family counts: deciding w
havior (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.09.001If a victim had close kin in Iceland, these relatives would have
claimed the compensation theywere entitled to under Norse customary
law (either a revenge killing or blood-money: Dunbar et al., 1995,
Byock, 2001). Since any attempts to gain compensation would have im-
pacted on the killer and his family, it is unlikely that the victim's kin
would not have beenmentioned had there been any. Honor was of par-
amount importance to the Vikings and failing to avenge amurdered rel-
ative incurred loss of face and opened the family up to further attacks
(Byock, 2001). Thus, if no kin are listed and no type of retribution is
mentioned, it can reasonably be assumed that the victim did not have
any kin in Iceland. Any family they may have had outside Iceland are ir-
relevant because they could not do anything about the murder, and
news of any such events would have taken months, even years, to
make its way to Scandinavia (assuming someone was interested
enough to pass it on).
Although it is inevitable that written accounts of historical events
will reﬂect the victor's viewpoint, there are at least four good reasons
for considering the Icelandic sagas as being broadly reliable as historical
documents. First, quantitative analysis of the social networks recorded
in the Icelandic family sagas reveals that their structure is very similar
to that for natural human social networks in the modern world. Saga
networks are small world with a power law degree distribution and
an exponential cutoff, and contain strong community structuring, and
are quite different to the networks found in ﬁction and myths from
the same period (e.g. Anglo-Saxon and Irish folk tales) (MacCarron &
Kenna, 2013). In other words, the sagas have the appearance of describ-
ing real social worlds rather than ﬁctional ones. Second,many of the de-
tails reported in sagas can be conﬁrmed from independent historical
and archeological sources, notably the Landnámabók which provides a
detailed record of land settlement and transactions. The Landnámabók
contains the names of some3000 individuals and 1400 settlements cov-
ering the ﬁrst two centuries after Iceland was ﬁrst colonized in 874 AD
(see ESM). Third, many individuals appear in several different sagas.
Hence, it is implausible to suppose that all saga compilers, writing inde-
pendently, would have failed to record the same individual's family re-
lationships where these actually existed, especially given the
importance of rights of inheritance to land through both sides of the
family. Failure by one saga to list an individual's family is plausible if
they were peripheral to the story, but failure by several sagas to do so
is signiﬁcantly less plausible. Indeed, large sections of the extended ped-
igree that provides the basis for this paper were built up by collating in-
formation across the sagas rather than from information given in a
single saga. In any case, it is by no means the case that only victims
lacked family: at least 10 (14%) of killers had no recorded kin. Fourth,hen to murder among the Icelandic Vikings, Evolution and Human Be-
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Fig. 1. Frequency distribution of numbers of murder victims per killer.
Fig. 2.Median (±50 and 95% ranges) total number of kin of all kinds for killers and their
victims.
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sation, either in the form of a revenge murder or blood money (the lat-
ter in quantities closely speciﬁed by degree of relationship to the victim)
(Byock, 2001). If no claims for compensation are mentioned in a saga, it
is almost certain that this is because the victim had no family in Iceland
rather than that the saga compiler simply failed tomention it. Therewas
toomuch at stake, both for the family of the victim and the killer and his
family. In short, contemporary historians now generally accept that the
family sagas are historically reliable, at least as far as individual identi-
ties and the main events are concerned (Firth, 2012).
Nonetheless, the pedigrees do suffer from two potential shortcom-
ings.Womenhave a less central role in the sagas: out of the 1020 people
recorded in our combined pedigree, only 196 (19%) are female. Many
matrilineal connections are thus likely to have been missed. However,
in contrast, the number of maternal kin connections actually recorded
(1589 connections) is only slightly less than the number of paternal
connections (2271 connections), mainly because the maternal and pa-
ternal relationships of the core characters are invariably given equal
weight (not least because, under Norse law, inheritances could be
claimed through both sides of the family). A second problem arises
from the fact that paternity uncertainty (Gaulin, McBurney, &
Brakeman-Wartell, 1997) might result in themisreporting of actual pa-
ternal relatedness. However, in Iceland, the Grágás (Gray Goose Laws, a
compilation of customary law) imposed very stiff penalties for any type
of extramarital activity (as opposed to concubinage) and, combined
with the importance placed on honor, the obligation to revenge slights
and the inheritance rights to land, would have served to reduce the
level of paternity uncertainty (Byock, 2001). We therefore consider it
unlikely that paternity uncertainty would seriously bias our results. In
the ﬁnal analysis, however, whether or not an individual was actually
someone's biological kin is probably less important in this context
than the fact that they were socially and emotionally part of the family,
and therefore viewed each other as kin and likely to come to each
other's aid.
We extracted all recorded non-accidental deaths resulting from
murder or ﬁghts. Any deaths that occurred in large-scale battles outside
Iceland were excluded. In some cases, two individuals were involved in
the death of another. If there was no clear indication of who dealt the
mortal blow and the saga itself is silent on the matter, both individuals
were considered responsible for the death. Since both individuals took
part in the action, they both ran the risk of revenge killing from the
victim's family. This makes the total number of killer–victim pairs 162
despite the number of victims being 153. For each killer and victim,
we determined the total number of kin out to cousins (r = 0.125) that
were listed on the pedigree, including both genetic and afﬁnal kin.
Even though we could identify foster kin out to cousins, only three cat-
egories of foster kin were included (foster-fathers, foster-sons and
foster-brothers), since these are the only categories mentioned by
name in the sagas and appear to be the only ones regarded as socially
and emotionally signiﬁcant. Finally, we also distinguished betweenma-
ternal and paternal kin where these could be identiﬁed.
3. Results
A total of 153 individual deaths which were the result of the inten-
tional actions of 66 individual killers were recorded. Of the 1020 indi-
viduals listed in the pedigree, no less than 15% (18.5% of all adult
males) were killed by another member of the community. The number
of victims per killer was not evenly distributed, however: 29 individuals
(44%)weremultiple killers and, of these, six killedmore than ﬁve times,
of which three were involved in the deaths of 16, 17 and 19 victims, re-
spectively (Fig. 1).
Overall, killers had signiﬁcantly more kin than victims (Fig. 2). We
show a boxplot here to give a sense of the overall distribution in the
two cases. The difference is highly signiﬁcant (mean number of kin:
16.4 ± 11.9 vs 5.8 ± 8.8; F1,322 = 82.72, p b 0.0001). Of the 66 killers,Please cite this article as: Palmstierna, M., et al., Family counts: deciding w
havior (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.09.00110 (14%) had no recorded kin, while 51 of the 153 victims (32%) had
no recorded kin. Of the 51 victims who lacked kin, six were foreigners
or slaves brought from Ireland, ﬁve were killed abroad, three were in-
troduced in the sagas using only their ﬁrst names (indicating their
lack of social importance) and four were only distantly related
(r b b0.125) to other members of the community. Of the 10 killers
who had no known kin, seven killed only once (and all their victims
lacked recorded kin). If we discount all cases where either the killer or
the victim had no recorded kin, the results are still highly signiﬁcant
(mean kin 17.8 ± 11.0 vs 8.7 ± 9.5; F1,258 = 44.31, p b 0.0001).
Of the 153 victims, none were related to their killer at the level of
cousin (r = 0.125) or closer. One victim was, however, an afﬁne (sis-
ter-in law) of her killer. Foster kin were the most numerous type of
close kin to be killed (a foster son and two foster brothers) (all the result
of a love triangle central to the story in the Laxdæla Saga). Using the
complete sample of 1020 individuals as the reference population, killers
were signiﬁcantly more likely to kill non-kin than either biological kin
(χ2 = 282.7, df = 1, p b 0.001) or afﬁnes (in-laws) (χ2 = 22.3, df =
1, p b 0.001). This was not, however, true of foster relatives (χ2 =
3.33, df= 1, p=0.068), though the sample ismuch smaller in this case.
For the 162 killer–victim pairs, the killer had more kin of all kinds
than the victim in 120 cases whereas the victim had as many or more
kin in only 42 (including 10 ties, of which seven had no kin in either
case) (excluding ties, χ2 = 37.6, df = 1, p b 0.0001). Considering only
biological kin, killers had more kin than victims in 105 cases while vic-
tims had as many or more in 57 (including 14 ties) (χ2 = 14.2, df =
1, p b 0.001). Weighting biological relatives by their estimated degree
of relatedness, r, to the individual concerned, killers have a higherhen to murder among the Icelandic Vikings, Evolution and Human Be-
4 M. Palmstierna et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior xxx (2016) xxx–xxxaverage kin degree in 117 cases while victims are higher in 36 cases
(with 9 ties) (χ2 = 42.9, df = 1, p b 0.0001).
Since side of family might be important, we repeated this analysis
considering paternal and maternal kin separately. Killers had more pa-
ternal biological kin than victims in 101 cases while victims had as
many or more in 61 cases (with 37 ties, including the seven with no
kin at all) (χ2 = 9.9, df = 1, p b 0.01). The mean number of paternal
kin was signiﬁcantly higher for killers (3.05) than victims (2.2)
(Wilcoxon matched pairs test, Z =−2.17 p = 0.03). Killers also had
more maternal biological kin than their victims in 115 cases while vic-
tims had as many or more in 47 cases (with 32 ties) (χ2 = 28.5, df =
1, p b 0.001). The mean number of recorded maternal kin was 2.74 for
killers vs 1.17 for victims (Wilcoxon Z =−3.56, p b 0.001). Killers had
more afﬁnal kin (in-laws: since all killers were male, by deﬁnition on
the female side) than their victims in 109 cases while victims had as
many or more in 53 cases (with 32 ties, including seven with no listed
afﬁnes at all) (χ2= 19.4, df= 1, p b 0.001). Themean number of afﬁnes
differed signiﬁcantly between killers (2.35) and victims (0.7) (Wilcoxon
Z =−5.48, p b 0.001).
Six individuals who feature prominently in the sagas were responsi-
ble for almost a third of all the deaths. Since these individuals are central
ﬁgures in the sagas, it may be that their pedigrees aremore fully record-
ed, and hence they may have biased the results. Reanalysing the results
without these six individuals yields a total of 60 killers and 84 victims, in
91 killer–victim combinations. For all categories of kin, killers hadmore
kin in 57 of the caseswhile victims had asmany ormore in 34 cases (in-
cluding nine ties; χ2 = 5.8, df = 1, p b 0.05). The average number of all
kin differed signiﬁcantly between killers (9.72) and victims (6.68)
(Wilcoxon Z =−2.699, p = 0.007). Similarly, killers averaged 7.18 bi-
ological kin, whereas victims averaged 5.39 (Wilcoxon Z = −2.28,
p = 0.022).
Fig. 3 plots the numbers of kin that killers and victims had against
the number of times an individual killer killed. There is a signiﬁcant pos-
itive relationship between the total number of kin that a killer had and
the number of times he killed (r= 0.343, N= 67 individual killers, p=
0.005), whereas the number of kin that the victims had is unrelated to
the number ofmurders their killer committed (r=−0.140, N=162 in-
dividual victims, p = 0.076). The difference in number of kin between
killers and their victims increases linearly with the number of victims
(r= 0.516, N= 162 killer–victim pairs, p b 0.0001). An analysis of var-
iance comparing thosewho only killed once, thosewho killed 2–4 times
and those who killedmore than four times, conﬁrms that the differenceFig. 3.Mean (±1se) number of kin for killers and their victims as a function of the number
of individuals the killer had killed. Although thenumber of kin victims had is unaffected by
their killer's success, the number of kin the killer had increaseswith the number of victims
they had.
Please cite this article as: Palmstierna, M., et al., Family counts: deciding w
havior (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.09.001in number of kin are signiﬁcant evenwhen controlling for killer identity
(F3,158 = 17.05, p b 0.0001), with killer identity not having a signiﬁcant
independent effect (F1,158 = 3.32, p = 0.070) and all pairwise compar-
isons signiﬁcant (Sheffé post hoc tests, p ≤ 0.031). These results suggest
that the more violent a killer, the more likely he was to target victims
with disproportionately fewer kin. Doing so both insured that the
odds were in his favor and greatly reduced the risk of retaliation. Only
thosewho killed once did not have signiﬁcantlymore kin than their vic-
tims (though, on average, even they had slightly more kin), perhaps be-
cause their murders were less calculated and more often spontaneous
responses to insults or casual attacks.
A more serious potential source of bias in these data is the fact that
killers obviously survived longer than their victims and so had an op-
portunity to sire offspring after the event in question. Because we can-
not deﬁne time sufﬁciently precisely in the sagas to know whether
individual killer's offspring were born before or after a particular event
(or more importantly, if born before the killing, whether or not they
were adult by the time of the event and so able to take a meaningful
part in any subsequent proceedings), killers' kinship tallies might have
been inﬂated. Indeed, killers had signiﬁcantly more offspring than vic-
tims (means of 0.97 vs 0.38, F1,217= 7.69, p= 0.006). Although it is un-
likely that a difference between killers and victims in total number of
kin (on average, about 8.2 kin) could be made up solely by offspring
sired after themurder (especially given that the average number of off-
spring across all killers and their victimswas just 0.56), thismight none-
theless have an effect on the results. Omitting offspring from the
calculation still yields a signiﬁcant difference in the net number of all
kin in favor of killers (means of 10.98 vs 5.04, F1,217 = 15.38,
p b 0.001; excluding foster kin: means of 9.73 vs 4.91, F1,217 = 15.86,
p b 0.001).
Killers and their victims are plotted in an extended kinship network
using Netdraw (Borgatti, 2002) in Fig. 4. With a density (the proportion
of all possible dyadic connections that actually exist) of 0.0169, the con-
nectedness of the network was in fact low, indicating that most individ-
uals were connected to each other mainly through a small number of
intermediates. In total, there were 607 kinship ties in the graph. Of
these, 162 were killer–victim relations – rather more than would have
expected by chance. Some individuals had many kin ties, and many of
these turn out to be a number of highly connected killers in central po-
sitions in the network. In effect, killers were related to other killers. It is
also interesting to note that most afﬁnal ties are between killers rather
thanbetweenvictims, suggesting a signiﬁcant degree of cooperation be-
tween afﬁnal relatives in feuds. However, many of the victims of the 34
multi-killers were also related to each other, suggesting that these
multi-killers were often involved in vendettas against speciﬁc families.
4. Discussion
Our sample of known individuals drawn from three Icelandic family
sagas indicated relatively high rates ofmortality: around 18% of all adult
males in the sample died at the hands of other members of their com-
munity. Archeological data suggest similarly high rates of mortality
from violence, especially among men, in other historical populations
over the past 12,000 years (Bowles, 2009; Firth, 2012; Meyer, Lohr,
Gronenborn, & Alt, 2015). The pattern of killings in our study is in line
with previous ﬁndings with narrower samples from other sagas
(Dunbar et al., 1995; Johnson & Johnson, 1991): no killer–victim
pairings involved close relatives. Our main interest, however, is with
the size of kinship groups because these index the risk of revenge kill-
ings. The analyses we present conﬁrm that victims had fewer kin than
their killers, and this was true whether we counted only biological kin,
only afﬁnes, only paternal kin or, within the limits of the data, only ma-
ternal kin, or all kinds of social and biological kin combined. This may
not, however, be true for foster kin (who share no genetic interests at
all), though the sample sizes are obviously much smaller in this case.
We cannot say whether non-kin allies also played a role in thesehen to murder among the Icelandic Vikings, Evolution and Human Be-
Fig. 4. Killers and victims mapped on the kinship pedigree for the Icelandic Vikings. Colour coding shown in online version. Green nodes are killers; blue nodes are victims. Killer–Victim
relations are indicated by red lines, brown lines those that involve multiple individuals. Biological kinship is indicated by blue lines, afﬁnes by green lines and foster kin by gray lines.
5M. Palmstierna et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior xxx (2016) xxx–xxxcalculations, but if they did it is clear that their effect was not sufﬁcient
to alter themain conclusion here, namely that kin count. That the differ-
ence in number of kin increases with the number of victims a killer was
credited with suggests that the more successful killers may have been
calculating the odds in their favor more carefully. Those who killed
only once were least likely to have more kin than their victims, possibly
because these cases occurred more often in the heat of the moment. Fi-
nally, the analysis of the network of kinship connections suggests that
frequent killers (i.e. thosewhokilledmore than once)weremore highly
interconnected by descent or, especially, marriage than their victims
were, further indicating that killers targeted individuals who were less
well connected in the wider community. There was, nonetheless,
some suggestion that killer families targeted particular families as vic-
tims, suggesting either vendettas or deliberate attempts to dispose of
rival claimants to land.
More importantly, our results suggest that Lanchester's Law (that
success is correlated with having overwhelming odds on one's side)
may apply not just to the size of ‘war parties’ but also to the size of
the protagonists' kinship groups and the background threat that these
imply. In effect, it is dangerous to mess with those who can call on
large support networks after the event, not just those who bring large
numbers of allies to the battleﬁeld on the day. Indeed, the sagas them-
selves note that people with a large number of social connections are
more dangerous as opponents, while commenting that a person with-
out any kin or friends could be killed without fear of retribution
(Miller, 1983). Of particular note is the fact that the disparity in kin
group size between killer and victim increasedwith the number ofmur-
ders that the killer perpetrated. Themore often an individual killed, the
more likely hewas to ensure that his victimhad fewer kin to call on than
he did, perhaps because the victims' families were thereby more likely
to opt for blood money compensation rather than a revenge murder
(Dunbar et al., 1995). An alternative possibility is that ﬁrst time killers
who got it wrong did not often get the chance to kill again.
Most conﬂicts arose over competition for resources (mainly land),
and killers thus disproportionately targeted unrelated lineages, often
with the explicit intention of acquiring their farms. Indeed, much ofPlease cite this article as: Palmstierna, M., et al., Family counts: deciding w
havior (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.09.001the Egil's Saga is devoted to the machinations whereby the eponymous
Egil Skallagrimsson deliberately targeted individuals whose land he
could acquire. If the many irritations of living in close proximity had
been the cause of violent behavior, then kin should be targeted dispro-
portionately because kin are more likely to live on the same farm or
nearby (and most described non-violent interactions were with kin).
The ﬁnite amount of arable land in combination with the strict inheri-
tance system (see ESM) was likely to put close kin in conﬂict with
each other for the same resources. In a sample that, as in the present
case, spans six generations, there would have been numerous instances
where an inheritance was divided between kin and hence became the
source of conﬂict. Yet not a single close biological relative (r ≥ 0.125)
was killed in a dispute over land in any of the sampled sagas. The fact
that kin experienced hardly any lethal conﬂict (see also Dunbar et al.,
1995) compared to unrelated individuals suggests that killers were
not simply ﬂailing out in frustration at those around them, but rather
deliberately targeting individuals whom they might defeat with mini-
mal cost so as to maximize the beneﬁt to themselves.
The fact that afﬁnal kin were spared just as much as biological kin
adds further support for Hughes' (1988) argument that afﬁnes may be
as relevant to an individual's decisions as their biological kin because af-
ﬁnes share a genetic interest in the offspring generation. This may be-
come especially important in humans where the wider kin circle acts
as a lineage-based alliance for protection against both raiding by con-
speciﬁcs and predators (Lehmann, Lee, & Dunbar, 2014). Indeed, the
sagas commonly observe that afﬁnes had as great an obligation to
exact revenge on behalf of their in-laws as biological kin did (Byock,
2001). Somewhat analogous ﬁndings have been reported from at least
one Amazonian Indian tribal society, where lethal raids on other com-
munities (in many cases for the purpose of acquiring women) typically
involved prospective brothers-in-law who were living in the same vil-
lage (Macfarlan, Walker, Flinn, & Chagnon, 2014).
The sample of foster kin was small, but the limited data available
suggest that foster kinship may not have exempted individuals from
being killed. Men fostered the offspring of their close (biologically unre-
lated) allies, usually as away of cementing the alliance between them. Ithen to murder among the Icelandic Vikings, Evolution and Human Be-
6 M. Palmstierna et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior xxx (2016) xxx–xxxis clear from the sagas that the relationships between foster parents
and their foster children, and between foster siblings, could sometimes
be as emotionally close as that between biological relatives. However,
the fact that foster kinship was relatively rare compared to more con-
ventional kinds of kinship relationships might suggest that the usual
mechanisms of psychological closeness are not so easily triggered.
Because foster parents were often lower ranking than the families of
the children they fostered (Byock, 1982), it may be that power relations
between the families sometimes undermined the psychological mecha-
nisms that might otherwise protect relationships based on growing up
in the same household. The fact that, in contrast to afﬁnal kinship,
foster kinship did not seem to protect an individual suggests that the el-
ement of indirect biological relatedness among afﬁnes (via their com-
mon genetic interest in the offspring generation) carried more weight
than purely social kinship, despite the deep psychological afﬁliations
often present in foster relationships. In this respect, foster relationships
may be functionally more similar to friendships (Burton-Chellew &
Dunbar, 2011).
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